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(2) The lower equilibrium is defined in a similar way, replacing limsup with liminf. (4) jL is a uniform equilibrium if H*(,t) is well defined and if there is a sequence of numbers {En}, converging to zero and an increasing sequence of integers {kn} such that ,A induces an en-Nash equilibrium in the kn times repeated game of G.
For an extensive study of uniform equilibria, see [S1].
TWO-PLAYER REPEATED GAMES Notation 2.8. (1) UEP = {H*(/x)\1u is an upper equilibrium}. (2) LEP = (H*(1z)lIt is a lower equilibrium}. (3) BEPL = {H*L(Iz)IL is an L equilibrium}.
(4) UNIF = {H*(,u)l,u is a uniform equilibrium}. Notation 2.9. If X is a set and s E S, then Ss will denote the Dirac measure on s, and will be the measure corresponding to s in A(E), the set of the probability measures over E.
Sometimes we will refer to Ss as s.
REMARK 2.10. The functions h = (hl, h2) and I = (1, 12) can be extended to A(l1) X A(C2) in a natural way, so that hi and 1i will be ranged to lR and A(Li), respectively, i = 1,2. From here on we will call elements in /i and in A(di) actions and mixed actions, respectively.
The main theorem. The main theorem characterizes the various equilibrium payoffs sets in the case where the information includes the payoffs, i.e., for each player i and joint pure actions (s, t), if hi(s, t) # hi(s', t'), then li(s, t) -li(s', t'). In simple words: if the payoff related to (s, t) differs from the payoff related to (s', t')
, then the signals related to these joint pure actions differ as well. A game of this kind will be called a game with observable payoffs.
The characterization is done by an equivalence relation and by a partial order defined on A(Yi). These relations were defined originally in [L2] . We will give the following definitions for actions of player 1. One can apply similar definitions for player 2. DEFINITION 
(1) Let s, s' E Z. s is equivalent to s' (s -s') if for every t E 2, 12(s, t)= 12(s', t). (2) Let p, p' e A(S1). p is equivalent to p' (p p') if for every t E 2, 12(p', t) = 12(p, t) (in the sense of Remark 2.10).
In words, p' p if the distributions over the signals of player 2 are the same under p as under p', for any action t. DEFINITION 
(1) Let s, s' E 1, s' is more informative than s if for every t, t' E S2, 11(s, t) -l1(s, t') implies 11(s', t) l1(s', t'). s' is greater than s (s' > s) if s ~ s' and if s' is more informative than s. (2) Let p, p' e A(l1). p' is greater than p (p' > p) if p' p and if there are nonnegative constants s,,, such that ps = Es P,,
Ps = Es, Ps,, and if s, s > 0, then s' is more informative than s.
In words, p' is greater than p, in the sense of the partial order >-, if p' -p and if by playing p' the player can distinguish between two actions of his opponent with a greater probability than he could do so by playing p. The intuitive interpretation of (2) is the following. The prescribed mixed action is to play s with probability ps. However, according to the deviation action, p', player 1 picks first an s with probability Ps and second, with probability s,, s/Ps, the action s', which he then plays. (2) IR = {(a, b) e ER2la > d1 and b > d2};
i.e., IR is the set of all individually rational payoffs.
(3) Let o-be an action of player 1 that satisfies: d2 = MaxqE a(2) h2(1, q). o2 is defined in a similar way. DEFINITION 3.6. The information of player i is trivial if for any s E Si and t, t' E S3-i, li(S, t) = li(S, t').
In the main theorem we give a characterization of the equilibrium payoffs, using terms of the one-shot game only. It turns out that in case of observable payoffs, all four notions of equilibria yield the same set of payoffs.
MAIN THEOREM 3.7. If G* is a two-person repeated game with observable payoffs, then:
( In order to introduce the examples that follow, let us define the partitions Sl, S2 of S1 and Z2, respectively. (iii) If p' p (resp., p' >-p) and q >-q (resp., q' q) satisfy (4.1) (resp., (4.2)) replacing >-with , then (p', q') e D1 n C2 (resp., C1 n D2).
PROOF. We will show (i). Assume to the contrary that (p', q') 0 C. Without loss of generality, (p', q') e C1, therefore there is p > p' s. PROOF. We will show it for Ci, and a similar proof holds for Di. The purpose of the following proposition is to facilitate the definition of an equilibrium which sustains payoffs in conv h(C) \ conv h(D). It turns out that such a payoff which is also an extreme point of type I can be written as h(p, q), where (i) q is a pure action and it is the best response up to a discovery, and (ii) by playing q only player 2 can already detect any profitable deviation of player 1. Thus, player 2 can play a pure action by which he can detect any profitable deviation of his opponent. Moreover, player 1 expects to get at any time only one signal, because player 2 should play a pure action. PROOF. We will prove (i). This means that (a, b) is not an UBP of type I in h(Conv D1 n C2) = Conv h(D1 n C2), which is a contradiction. Thus, q E E2.
It is enough to show that Conv h(C) n IR v Conv h(C1) n Conv h(C2) n IR. Let (a', b') e Conv h(C1) n Conv h(C2) n IR, and let (a, b') and (a', b) be two upper boundary points of Conv h(C1) n Conv h(C2) of types I and II, respectively. By Lemma 4.7, (a', b), (a, b') E Conv h(C). By Proposition 4.3 there is (u1, u2) < (d1, d2), and (ul, u2) E h(D). By the definition h(D) c h(C) and

By the previous lemma there is (p, q) E D1 n C2 such that h(p, q) = (a, b). If, to
Auxiliary Claim. We can assume, without loss of generality, that there is no other q' E ~2 such that q' >-q and q a-q'.
PROOF OF THE CLAIM. If there is such a pure action let q' be a maximum with respect to >-. We obtain h2(p, q') < h2(p, q), because h2(p, q') > h2(p, q) means that (p, q) i C2. We have two cases. In the first one, h2(p, q') = h2(p, q), we can take q' instead of taking q and get the desired claim. The second case, h2(p, q') < h2(p, q), will lead to a contradiction. We assumed that h(p, q) * D. Thus, by Proposition 4.10, h(p,q) < SPO. However, if the second case holds and q' is a maximum with respect to >-, we get that (p, q') e D1 n C2. Thus h(p, q) = EX,(Conv h(C)), a contradiction.
Return (a) q is a pure strategy and it is a best response versus p among all the strategies that are greater (>-) than q.
(b) p is the best response versus q among all the strategies that preserve the same distribution on L2, while player 2 plays q. In other words, p is not only the best response among all p' such that p' >-p, it is the best response among a bigger set, namely the set of the actions that preserve the distribution over player 2's signals while he is playing q (and not necessarily while playing other pure actions).
The second property is crucial for the construction of the strategies in the third step of the next section. Player 2 will be required to adhere to q. It will be his best response up to a discovery, on one hand, and it will be sufficient, otherwise, for detecting any profitable deviation of player 1. For any pair of behavior strategies (fl, f2), we can define Hn(fl, f2), n = 1, 2,..., and H*(f1, f2) as in ?2. In addition, we can define for any n e I a probability measure, prob(fl, f)('), on L7 for i e (1, 2) and on Li x L2, in a natural way.
PROOF. We will divide the proof into seven steps, as follows: 1. LEP c Conv h(C) n IR. 2. Convh(D) n IR c UEP.
[d Conv h(C) \ Conv h(D)] n IR c UEP. By combining Steps 2 and 3 we arrive at:
4. Conv h(C) n IR c UEP.
5. BEPL = LEP = UEP.
6. UNIF = UEP. (The first six steps provide the proof of the nontrivial case.) 7. The seventh step proves the trivial information case.
Step 1. LEP c Conv h(C) n IR. By [L2] , the LEP of any two-player repeated game with nonobservable actions is equal to Convh(C1) n Conv h(C2) n IR. By Proposition 4.8, it is equal to Conv h(C) n IR.
Step 2 In order to describe the equilibrium pair of strategies (fl, f2), we will define what we will call the "master plan"2 of player 1 in block Mk. The master plan of player 1 in block Mk is to play pi at the stages of Mk.
During the game, player 1 does some statistical tests. The relevant data for these tests are the following. Let j E {1, 2,3}, e E L1 and let Mk be some former block. Denote O(e) = #{n E MkIlThe signal given to player 1 at stage n was e}, i.e., Ok(e) is the number of stages in Mk in which signal e was observed by player 1.
If player 1 plays pJ and player 2 plays qk, then the probability that player 1 will get the signal e will be denoted by prob(pj, q)(e). f, is defined as follows: player 1 plays his master plan, unless he has come to the conclusion that player 2 had deviated in some previous block of the same super block. If he finds a deviation in the same super block, player 1 acts so as to punish player 2, i.e., by playing o-(see Definition 3.5(3)). If player 1 finds e E L1, and j E {1, 2, 3} so that (i) Both players played their master plan at Mk, but it so happened that one of them came to the conclusion that his opponent had deviated. If player 1 came to this conclusion, it means that he found t e {1,2,3} and e e L1 so that (5.1) holds. Similarly for player 2 if he came to the conclusion that his opponent had deviated. What is the probability of these events? We will find an upper bound of the probability that (5.1) holds for certain j E (1, 2, 3), k E N and e e L1. By Chebyshev inequality we get for some constants c2, c3, whenever k is sufficiently large. The probability that (5.1) has occurred for any j and e in block Mk is less than (c3/k50) ? (#{1,2,3} ? IL1) = c4/k50. We now obtain that the probability of case (i) occurring is bounded by 2 * c4/k50 (the 2 is for two players).
(ii) The second case is when one of the players did not play his master plan at the former block, Mk. However, if (fl, f2) is played, it means that case (i) has occurred in some previous block, Mk, which belongs to the same super block, say, Bl. The probability of this case is bound by We have to calculate the probability of several events. We are interested in the event where player 2 gains by a deviation without being detected. By the first 213 computation we will find the probability that player 2's payoff in Mk does not exceed by much his prescribed payoff, b, given that no deviation has been detected by player 1 in Mk (i.e., (5.1) does not hold for Mk) and that player 1 plays in Mk according to the master plan (i.e., no deviation has been found by him in that particular super block so far). By a similar method we will later compute the probability of the same event without assuming that player 1 plays according to the master plan. By Lemma To recapitulate: given that (5.1) does not hold for all blocks Mk, (k' < k) of the same super block B1, with probability of at least 1 -(21i11 1I,2c1/k50) and that player 1, playing according to the master plan, does not come to the conclusion that player 2 had deviated at block Mk (i.e., that (5.1) does not hold) is less than c2/k5? when k is big enough and c2 is a constant. Now we proceed by evaluating the probability that player 2 gains by more than 61l 12lc1ek above his prescribed payoff b, while player 1 punishes rather than adheres to the master plan.
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By an argument similar to the one above, given that R,(s1) = o'1(s1) (which means that for some Mk,, k' < k in the same Bl (5.1) does hold), with probability of at least 1 -(I1|I Iz21c1)/k50 we have b. One can show that the method employed here goes through not only in the case of observable actions but also in any information structure. Notice that the definition of D as well as the proof do not rely on the particular information structure assumed here.
Step
[d Conv h(C) \ Conv h(D)] U IR c UEP. The difference between payoffs in h(D) and payoffs in h(C) \ Conv h(D) is that if (p, q) E D, the player can take
care of a deviation of the opponent during the regular game by playing (p', qE) for some E, and counting the number of times each signal has appeared. However, if (p, q) e C\D, it can happen that player 1, for example, will have p' such that p' -p but p' 4-p, which increases his payoff. p' -p means that p' does not change 216 TWO-PLAYER REPEATED GAMES the probability of any signal in L2, while player 2 continues playing q. Therefore, player 2 cannot take care of player l's deviations during the regular game.
How can player 2 ensure that player 1 will play only strategies p that are greater than p? Player 2 can check player 1 whether the latter knows about the actions that took place at the former stages. Whenever p >-p, if by playing p player 1 can tell the difference between two actions, then he can also tell the difference by playing p. Thus if player 1 does not know something he could have known by playing p, player 2 comes to the conclusion that an action which is not greater than p was played. In general, the players, in order to transmit information to one another, have to play an action that does not sustain the equilibrium payoff. For this reason this information is transmitted in a set of stages that have no influence on the payoff, namely a set with zero density. However, if a deviation is detected long after it has occurred, the deviator profits in the meantime. If the punishment would hold only for a while, and then the player would return to the master plan, the upper limit of the average payoffs of the deviator might exceed his prescribed payoff. This means that the strategy would have not been an upper equilibrium. Thus, the punishment has to take place from the detection moment on, forever. With this kind of punishment, however, the strategies must be qualified in such a way that if a player punishes his opponent, then there is a probability 1 that a deviation has actually taken place. We are able to define such a strategy by using the properties of the extreme points of Conv h(C), which are not in Conv h (D) . Indeed, by Proposition 4.14, each extreme point is sustained by a pair of strategies (p1, P2), where one, say pi, is a pure action and the other, say P3_, is a best response versus pi among all the actions that preserve the distribution over Li. This property of P3-i enables player i to prevent his opponent from deviating only by playing pi; no other action is needed for detecting profitable deviations. So player i plays with probability one the pure action p,, which enables player 3 -i to punish only in those cases where deviation has actually occurred, i.e., the probability for him to be mistaken is zero.
Let ( The strategies are defined as follows: for each k E N, in stages of Mk, player 2 plays the pure action q1 and player 1 plays pi = Pi, except in the cases described below. After each block player 1 checks the signal he got at that block. Player 2 must always play a pure action; thus, by checking his signals, player 1 can discover deviations to strategies q satisfies that q -qj with probability 1. In case he finds a defection, he punishes player 2 forever. However, player 2 has the option to deviate to an action q which is equivalent to qj, but q ;-qj.
The way to prevent player 2 from deviating to such q is to "ask" him, at the stages of the zero density set, W, about signals he received at previous stages. By asking a in W, where n < wi(n), 1 < i < r. In these stages player 2 will have to answer "Yes-No" questions about the signal he got at stage n. It is enough to ask3 r = L21 -1 "Yes-No" questions to know what signal player 2 got at any stage. Call these questions 41, q2 ,... Ir. When player 1 finds a wrong answer he comes to the conclusion that q such that q v-qj was played and he then punishes player 2 forever. Player 2 also checks his opponent at the end of Mk. If the relative frequency of appearance of each signal does not exceed the expected number by more than Ek, he punishes player 1 and the punishment is carried out forever. Therefore, player 1 has to be careful not to repeat any action too many times. At any stage r e Mk, player 1 has to check for each action u E 1, how many times he acted u. In case he finds 0 # T c 1, so that every u E T is carried out at Mk more than #Mk(pj(u) + 2Ek) times, then at the rest of the Mk, i i t is no t p that will be played but rather p where , f2) = (a, b) and that (fl, f2) is an upper equilibrium point is based on arguments similar to those employed in the proof of the second step. Notice that the probability that player 1 will not play pi at stage t E Mk,, but rather PI for some T t 0, in infinitely many blocks is by using the Chebyshev inequality and the Borel-Cantelli lemma, equal to zero. Therefore, the probability that player 2 will profit by a deviation on those stages where player 1 does not play pi but pkr for some T # 0 infinitely many times is zero. This means that the limsup of the expected average payoffs does not exceed the prescribed payoff.
REMARK 5.10. a. The strategy of the previous step could be defined in another way, namely player 1 will play always pk and player 2 will punish player 1 in a case where the relative frequency of a certain signal is far from the expected frequency by at least 2ek. As in Step 2, this punishment has to take place in a finite number of stages. The proof that such a punishment will occur infinitely many times, while player 1 plays according to the prescribed strategy has probability zero, involves the arguments that appeared in Step 2.
b. Notice that the strategy defined here is not uniform. The reason is that information about what has been played at stage t is transmitted long after time t. Thus, for any time T, there are many stages t, t < T, about which a player will have to inform long after T. Therefore, in the T-fold repeated game, the strategy does not induce an almost Nash equilibrium. In Step 6, we will modify the strategy, still using the idea of asking and answering "Yes"-"No" questions, to define a uniform equilibrium.
Step 4 1 -a)(c, d) .
The proof that (k1, k2) is an upper equilibrium is achieved by employing the proof of Step 2.
Step 5. BEPL = LEP = UEP. Obviously UEP c BEPL for any L. That side of the proof in [L2] that proves LEP c Conv h(Cl) n Conv h(C2) n IR can be translated easily into terms of Banach equilibrium. Since, by Steps 1-4, LEP c UEP, and by the definitions UEP c LEP, we get the desired equality.
Step 6. UNIF = UEP. It is clear that UNIF c UEP. To show that UEP c UNIF one should construct for every point in UEP a strategy that sustains it. As was noted We will use a method described by Sorin [S2] in order to modify the strategy of Step 3.
Recall that #Mk = k0l0. Any block Mk will be divided into k99 subblocks, each of which with length k. Between any two subblocks we will insert two segments of stages. In the first one, a state from the previous subblock will be chosen randomly by player 2. In the second segment, player 1 will have to inform about the signal that he received at the chosen stage.
In the first segment, which is of length [log k] + 1, player 1 plays with probability 2 each of the actions s1 and s2. These random moves generate a random string of length [log k] + 1. The random strings encode stages in the subblock and thereby assign any stage a probability of at least 1/2k. Player 2 can observe the random string by playing v, while player 1 randomizes. Immediately after observing the random string, player 2 should report the signals he got at the stage encoded by that string. This report takes place in the second segment of stages that follows every subblock.
Thus, this segment should be of length 1I21 -1.
To recapitulate, we have the block Mk which is divided into subblocks of length k each. Two segments of stages proceed any subblock. The purpose of these segments is to check possible deviations of player 2 in the previous subblock. At the first segment, player 1 announces the stage at which player 2 will have to inform in the following segment, the second one.
From the moment player 1 discovers a deviation, he punishes his opponent forever. The description of player 2's strategy is very much the same as the one given in Step 3. Denote the strategy defined here by f.
As opposed to the strategy defined in Step 3, in f the report player 2 must send to player 1 is not delayed until the far future. Here it is done immediately after any subblock, at the expense that on signals of any stage t, player 2 is asked only with a positive probability and not with probability one.
Let nk = Ek',k#Mk,.
To see that, indeed, f is a uniform strategy, observe the following.
